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Summary
In calling for a clear, strong, and long-term commitment to support the military-
dominated government of Pakistan despite serious concerns about that country’s
nuclear proliferation activities, The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States cast into sharp relief two long-standing contradictions
in U.S. policy towards Pakistan and South Asia.  First, in over fifty years, the United
States and Pakistan have never been able to align their national security objectives
except partially and temporarily.  Pakistan’s central goal has been to gain U.S.
support to bolster its security against India, whereas the United States has tended to
view the relationship from the perspective of its global security interests.  Second,
U.S. nuclear nonproliferation objectives towards Pakistan (and India) repeatedly have
been subordinated to other U.S. goals.  During the 1980s, Pakistan successfully
exploited its importance as a conduit for aid to the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahidin to
deter the application of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation law.  Not only did Pakistan
develop its nuclear weapons capability while receiving some $600 million annually
in U.S. military and economic aid, but some of the erstwhile mujahidin came to form
the core of Al Qaeda and Taliban a decade later.
Congress has endorsed and funded for FY2005 a request from the Bush
Administration for a new five-year, $3 billion, package of U.S. economic and
military assistance to Pakistan.  Some Members of Congress and policy analysts have
expressed concern that once again the United States will be constrained from
addressing serious issues concerning Pakistan’s nuclear activities by the need for
Islamabad’s help — this time to capture or kill members of Al Qaeda and the Afghan
Taliban.  A crucial U.S. policy challenge is to gain Pakistani cooperation in shutting
down the network of nuclear suppliers established in the 1990s by the self-designated
“father” of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, which  facilitated illicit
sales of nuclear enrichment technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea, while
simultaneously supporting stability in Pakistan and maintaining maximum
cooperation against terrorism.  Press reports indicate that the network is far more
extensive than previously thought, and that Pakistan has denied access to Khan, who
is now under house arrest, by U.S. intelligence officials. 
This report: (1)  briefly recounts previous failed efforts to reconcile American
nuclear nonproliferation and other policy objectives regarding Pakistan; (2)
documents Pakistan’s role in supplying nuclear technology to “rogue” states and how
these activities escaped detection by U.S. intelligence agencies; (3) considers issues
regarding the objectives, and viability of the military-dominated government headed
by President Pervez Musharraf; and, (4) outlines and evaluates several U.S. options
for seeking to gain more credible cooperation from Pakistan’s regarding its nuclear
activities while still maintaining its counterterrorist cooperation.  This report will not
be updated.
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Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities
and the Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission:
U.S. Policy Constraints and Options
In calling for a clear, strong, and long-term commitment to support the military-
dominated government of Pakistan headed by President Pervez Musharraf despite
serious concerns about that country’s nuclear proliferation activities, The Final
Report of the 9/11 Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
otherwise known as The 9/11 Commission Report, cast into sharp relief two long-
standing contradictions in U.S. policy towards Pakistan and South Asia .  First, in
over fifty years, the United States and Pakistan have never been able to align their
national security objectives except partially and temporarily.   Pakistan’s central goal
has been to gain U.S. support to bolster its security against India, whereas the United
States has tended to view the relationship from the perspective of its global security
interests.  Second, U.S. nuclear nonproliferation objectives towards Pakistan (and
India) have repeatedly been subordinated to other U.S. goals.  During the 1980s,
Pakistan successfully exploited its importance as a conduit for aid to the anti-Soviet
Afghan mujahidin to deter the imposition of economic and military sanctions that
were prescribed by U.S. nuclear nonproliferation laws.  
Ironically, not only did Pakistan develop its nuclear weapons capability while
receiving some $600 million annually in U.S. military and economic aid, but the
leadership ranks of Al Qaeda and the Taliban include some of the very same radical
Islamists nurtured by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization and
supported and armed by the CIA in the successful effort to drive the Russian Army
out of Afghanistan.  Some observers view this reality as cause for not losing sight of
U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and other interests when seeking to forge closer
antiterrorism ties to a country that has been a major and recent source of the
proliferation of nuclear technology and materials, and which also faces some degree
of risk of itself falling under the control of radical Islamists.  
Both the 9/11 Commission  Report and the legislation enacted to implement its
recommendations for intelligence reform, P.L. 108- 458 (S. 2845), and the foreign
assistance appropriation for FY2005, P.L. 108-447 (H.R. 4818) address the issue of
strengthening U.S. military and economic support of Pakistan in the interest of
counterterrorism cooperation and stabilizing the country against Islamist extremism.
Neither the report nor the legislation adopted by the 108th Congress, however,
includes comprehensive policy recommendations or specific measures for dealing
with Pakistan’s nuclear activities.  This report seeks, in part, to shed light on whether
there may be ways for gaining more leverage with Pakistan on the proliferation issue
without jeopardizing Islamabad’s cooperation on terrorism.
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Figure 1. Country Map of Pakistan
Congress has now endorsed and funded for FY2005 a request from the Bush
Administration for a new five-year, $3 billion, package of U.S. economic and
military assistance to Pakistan, this time to gain Pakistani cooperation in the fight
against terrorism.  Some Members of Congress and policy analysts have expressed
concern that once again the United States will be constrained from addressing serious
issues concerning Pakistan’s nuclear activities by the need for Islamabad’s help —
this time to capture or kill members of Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.  
Press reports in late December, 2004, underscore the challenge of addressing the
terrorist and nuclear threats simultaneously in U.S. policy towards Pakistan.  The
New York Times reported on December 26, 2004, that both the Bush Administration
and the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) have
gathered evidence in the Middle East and Asia indicating that the illicit nuclear
supply network set up in the 1990s by Pakistan’s most celebrated  nuclear scientist,
Dr. A. Q. Khan, may be much more extensive than previously assumed.  The
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1 “As Nuclear Secrets Emerge, More Are Suspected.”  New York Times, Dec. 26, 2004: 1,
12. 
2 Remarks of 9/11 Commission Lee Hamilton at a hearing, 9/11Commission
Recommendations for U.S. Diplomacy.  Hearing, House International Relations Committee,
Aug. 24, 2004.
3 U.S. Department of State, “Interview At Christian Science Monitor’s Newsmaker Press
Briefing Luncheon.”  Dec 21, 2004; “As Nuclear Secrets Emerge, More Are Suspected.”
New York Times, Dec. 26, 2004, op. cit.
evidence is said to include the discovery in Libya of plans for an atomic bomb and
other elements of a “nuclear starter kit.” Reportedly, some U.S. experts strongly
suspect that Khan’s network, rather than Russia, as had been long assumed, has been
the source of most of Iran’s nuclear know-how and technology.  Underscoring the
American dilemma, some contend that  concerns about the stability of Pakistan, a key
ally in the war against terrorism, have made the Administration reluctant to pressure
the military-dominated government of President Pervez Musharraf to gain access to
A. Q. Khan.1
In theory, achieving the two most critical U.S. policy objectives relating to
Pakistan — defeating radical Islamic terrorism and deterring nuclear proliferation —
are complementary, since the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is, in the
words of the Vice-Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, former Representative Lee
Hamilton, “the ultimate nightmare.”  In practice, however, the historical record
shows that the dual American objectives often have been operationally incompatible,
especially democracy promotion and nuclear proliferation.  From that perspective,
Vice-Chairman Hamilton observed at an August 24, 2004 hearing of the House
International Relations Committee,  “I think Pakistan represents as tough a problem
as there is in American foreign policy today.”2
A key U.S. policy issue raised in this report is whether there should be any
nuclear nonproliferation conditions on U.S. aid to Pakistan and under what
circumstances, if any, the President and Congress might recalculate the relative
importance of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and anti-terrorism policy objectives. The
issue of policy tradeoffs is especially acute given the discovery in 2003 of A. Q.
Khan’s network.  Most nuclear proliferation experts contend that Khan must have
had significant logistical support from elements in the Pakistani military and the
civilian nuclear establishment, whether acting in support of Pakistani security policy
or his own desire for private gain, or both.  In what appeared to be a carefully worded
response at a December 21, 2004 press interview, Secretary of State Colin Powell
indicated that the Administration accepted President Musharraf’s statement that he
had no knowledge of Khan’s activities, but it also appears that the Administration has
not been able to gain access to Khan.3  Even if the reluctance of the Administration
to confront Pakistan directly over its nuclear activities is warranted in view of the
seriousness of the terrorist threat, there may be other ways the United States can
reduce the dangers posed by Pakistan’s continuing proliferation potential.
Pakistan’s cooperation with the war on terror is not directly a subject of this
report, in part because the relative value of such cooperation, as compared to the
inhibiting effect on U.S. nonproliferation policy, cannot be assessed from open
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4 These reports are most apparent in the Indian press, but statements by some U.S. officials
appear indirectly to validate the reports.  The State Department’s annual Patterns of Global
Terrorism, released on April 29, 2004, lists several groups that appear to operate across the
de facto border, though the report does not address the issue of any official Pakistani
involvement with the groups.  See section on Pakistan in the South Asia chapter, and
“Appendix C — Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups.”  See also CRS Report
RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia. Updated Dec. 13, 2004 [by K. Alan Kronstadt and Bruce
Vaughn], p. 28-31.
5 This section was prepared by Richard Cronin.
source information. However, the value of such cooperation could be an important
factor in determining the extent to which the United States should compromise its
nonproliferation objectives in the interest of gaining Pakistan’s cooperation against
terrorism.  Although Pakistan has captured or facilitated the capture of hundreds of
alleged terrorists, including some very high level Al Qaeda figures, persistent reports
question whether Pakistan has given as much assistance as it could, and they suggest
ongoing relationships between Pakistan’s military intelligence officers and some key
Taliban leaders who are thought to live openly in northern Pakistan.4
This report briefly recounts previous failed efforts to reconcile conflicting
American regional security and nuclear nonproliferation policy objectives regarding
Pakistan; (2) documents Pakistan’s most recent role in supplying nuclear technology
to “rogue” states and how these activities escaped detection by U.S. intelligence
agencies; (3) considers issues regarding the nature, objectives, and viability of the
military-dominated government headed by President Pervez Musharraf; and, (4)
outlines a series of unilateral and multilateral U.S. options, with a discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of each, for gaining further nuclear nonproliferation
cooperation from Pakistan and forestalling future exports from Pakistan of nuclear
and dual-use components, materials, and technology.  This report will not be updated.
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission:
“Hard Choices” or the Same Choices5
The 9/11 Commission Report emphasizes the need for “hard choices”and
“difficult long-term commitments” to Pakistan.  The Report explicitly notes that the
need for a pragmatic approach inevitably involves compromises with other important
U.S. interests such as democracy and nuclear non-proliferation.  The Report does not
address the issue of where the balance should be struck between supporting the
Musharraf government as a necessary means of fighting terrorism. Instead, the Report
emphasizes Musharraf’s “moderate”  views and the grave danger if radical Islamists
gained control of the Pakistani state and its stock of nuclear weapons.   Nor does the
Report address substantively the question of how the United States should respond
if Pakistan engages in significant nuclear proliferation activities in the future.
Instead of hard choices, some observers judge that the Bush Administration and
Congress have no option but to provide substantial assistance to Pakistan to bolster
Musharraf and to gain the closest possible antiterrorist cooperation from Islamabad,
without regard to issues such as democracy and nuclear proliferation.  From this
CRS-5
6 Eleven industrialized democracies — nine NATO countries plus Australia and Japan —
endorsed a “Statement of Interdiction Principles” in Paris in September 2003.  Since then,
many additional countries have also endorsed the principles, and several exercises have been
conducted by U.S., European, Australian, and Japanese forces.  U.S. Department of State,
Bureau  of  Nonpro l i fe ra t ion ,  “Pro l i fe ra t ion  Secur i t y  In i t i a t ive .”
[http://www.state.gov/t/np/c10390.htm].  See links for additional information.
perspective, the issue may be less one of choices than unpleasant realities.  The
hardest choices may in fact  be those faced by President Musharraf,  given the broad
public antipathy in Pakistan towards U.S. policy in the Middle East, including the
war in Iraq and support of Israel, and the widely held misperception that the U.S. war
on terrorism is in fact a war against Islam.
 Also, because of its mandate, the 9/11 Commission focused more on the
urgency of  maintaining a stable and cooperative government in Islamabad that would
remain a partner in the war against terrorism and less on Pakistan’s role as a source
of nuclear proliferation. In the view of the 9/11 Commission, maintaining close
cooperation with Pakistan in the fight against Al Qaeda and keeping Pakistani
nuclear capabilities out of the hands of terrorists depends critically on supporting
President Pervez Musharraf’s vision of a moderate, modernizing Islamic state.
The 9/11 Commission addressed in an oblique manner the issue of Pakistan’s
past nuclear proliferation activities and the risk of further proliferation emanating
from Pakistan.  The Report’s section on Pakistan  acknowledges, but does not dwell
on, Pakistan’s continuing  potential to be a source of technology and know-how for
other states or terrorist groups intent on acquiring nuclear weapons. It noted President
Musharraf’s repeated assurances that “Pakistan does not barter with its nuclear
technology,” but also observed that “proliferation concerns have been long-standing
and very serious.” 
Another section of the 9/11 Commission Report dealing more generally with the
threat of nuclear proliferation takes note of Khan’s role in establishing illegal covert
networks for global transfer of nuclear technology and materials, but its
recommendations are not Pakistan-specific.  Rather, the Report emphasizes
multilateral solutions based especially on “an international legal regime with
universal jurisdiction to enable the capture, interdiction, and prosecution of
smugglers” by any state that finds them operating covertly in its territory.  The Report
specifically calls for expanding the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and
the 1991 “Nunn-Lugar”Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR).  The PSI
emphasizes international cooperation to interdict WMD and ballistic missile
shipments, while the CTR concentrates on securing nuclear weapons and other
dangerous materials scattered throughout the territories of the former Soviet Union,
which could fall into the hands of terrorists.6
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7 This section was prepared by Richard P. Cronin and Sharon Squassoni.
8 When India and Pakistan went to war in 1965 and 1971, the United States not only refused
to assist Pakistan but cut off military assistance to both countries, an act which hurt Pakistan
far more than India.  Pakistani resentment of U.S. policy in the 1971-1972 war was
particularly deep, since a diplomatic “tilt” towards Pakistan carried out by President Nixon
and Secretary of  State Henry Kissinger failed to prevent the loss of the country’s rebellious
eastern wing, which became Bangladesh. President Nixon ordered a “tilt” towards Pakistan
in a building confrontation between India and Pakistan over a rebellion in East Pakistan after
the West Pakistani-dominated military government refused to recognize the achievement of
an absolute majority by the main East Pakistani party following 1970 elections. The
Administration valued Pakistan’s assistance in the U.S. opening to China in 1971, including
facilitating a secret trip to Beijing by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and
believed that India , viewed as pro-Soviet, was exploiting the situation.  Nonetheless, as the
confrontation developed the Administration was not willing to provide active military
support.  Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan: Disenchanted Allies.  Washington:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.  P.
194.
9 Bhutto was an urbane Pakistani aristocrat and a Muslim from the Shi’a minority, but by
no means a radical Islamist.  In his autobiography written in a jail cell following his
overthrow by General Zia al-Huq in 1977, Bhutto partly justified his role in seeking a
nuclear weapons capability for Pakistan by observing that there was a Christian bomb, a
Jewish bomb, and a Hindu bomb, and vowing that Pakistan would build an Islamic bomb.
In this particular context, Bhutto’s use of the phrase appears related to his resentment of the
perceived discrimination against Pakistan on the part of the United States and other western
countries, and his belief that Israel and India enjoyed western favor because of bias against
(continued...)
Past as Prologue:  Pakistan and the Recurrent
Dilemma of Conflicting U.S. Policy Goals7
The effort to reconcile U.S. nuclear proliferation objectives towards Pakistan
with more immediate American regional and global security concerns has a long and
less than encouraging history.  References by the 9/11 Report to Pakistan’s
perception of the United States as an unreliable ally relate directly to fundamental
differences in U.S. and Pakistani expectations of the alliance, and the consequent
unwillingness of several U.S. Administrations to support Pakistan in its wars with
India in 1965 and 1971.8
India’s 1974 Nuclear Test and the Beginning of the U.S.
Policy Dilemma
Pakistan emerged as a major source of nuclear proliferation concern following
India’s underground test of 1974, which itself was a delayed response to China’s
1965 nuclear test.  Because its technological base was far smaller than India’s,
Pakistan concentrated on obtaining nuclear materials and technology from abroad.
Successful U.S. diplomatic efforts in the late 1970s to prevent France from delivering
a uranium reprocessing plant to Pakistan marked the beginning of a long struggle to
prevent Pakistan from acquiring what some, including the then-Prime Minister of
Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, even then called the “Islamic bomb.”9  U.S. efforts
CRS-7
9 (...continued)
Islam.  He also appeared to believe that Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons
capability would garner more economic and political support from Middle East and Persian
Gulf countries.  Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, “If I Am Assassinated...”.  New Delhi, India, etc.:
Vikas Publishing House, 1979.
10 Revised versions of these sanctions remain as Section 101(Nuclear Enrichment Transfers;
22 U.S.C. 2799aa) and Section 102 (Nuclear Reprocessing Transfers, Illegal Exports for
Nuclear Explosive Devices, Transfers of Nuclear Explosive Devices, and Nuclear
Detonations; 22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1) of the Arms Control Export Act, amended.  More detail
is contained in CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile
Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack, p. 9-11.
11 Richard Cronin and Warren Donnelly,”Congress and Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,”
in Congress and Foreign Policy, 1980.  Committee Print, House International Relations
Committee, 1981.
eventually were overtaken by Cold War developments that caused successive U.S.
administrations and Congress to flinch repeatedly as Islamabad transgressed each
new U.S. “red line.”
From the time of India’s first nuclear test in 1974, Congress has played the
leading role in formulating the legislative parameters governing U.S. nonproliferation
policy.  Pakistan’s efforts to acquire technology from abroad, as well as concern that
the Ford Administration had not responded adequately to India’s abuse of U.S. and
Canadian peaceful nuclear assistance, led Congress in the late 1970s to enact two
landmark nuclear nonproliferation provisions to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)
of 1961, amended.  Section 669 (Symington Amendment),  of the FAA, first enacted
in 1976, banned U.S. economic, and military assistance, and export credits to
countries that have not placed all of their nuclear facilities and materials under the
inspection regime of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
that deliver or receive, acquire or transfer nuclear enrichment technology.  Section
670 (Glenn Amendment), first adopted in 1977, provided the same sanctions in the
case of countries that acquire or transfer nuclear reprocessing technology or explode
or transfer a nuclear device.  These provisions, amended, are now contained in
Sections 101 and 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).10
Congress had India as well as Pakistan in mind when it enacted the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978, which also generally enjoyed the support of
the Carter Administration.  The NNPA, among other things, bans the sale of U.S.
uranium fuel to countries that do not accept the imposition of “full-scope” IAEA
inspections and safeguards. Because of India’s unwillingness to accept these terms,
the United States abrogated a 30-year bilateral agreement under which it had
committed to sell low-enriched uranium fuel for India’s U.S.-supplied Tarapur
Atomic Power Station.11 
Alternating U.S. Policy Priorities Towards Pakistan
The United States chose its nuclear proliferation interests over its regional
security interests in April 1979, when President Carter cut off U.S. assistance to
Pakistan under Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act, but this prioritization
CRS-8
12 Two Americans, a Marine defending the embassy and an airman in his apartment, and two
Pakistani employees died in the attacks, but more than one hundred Americans and
Pakistanis narrowly escaped burning to death. The Pakistani army stood by for several hours
and only arrived on the scene after the riot was over.  Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret
History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10,
2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004): 21-23. 
13 Ibid., p. 51.
proved short-lived.  Carter’s action followed the revelation that the then young A. Q.
Khan secretly had acquired the plans for uranium enrichment technology while
working at a European nuclear facility in the Netherlands.   Later, in November of the
same year, U.S.-Pakistan relations reached a nadir after a mob attacked and burned
the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and several  other U.S. facilities in response to false
reports, possibly spread by the Iranian revolutionary leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini,
that the United States was somehow involved in a takeover of the Grand Mosque in
Mecca by Islamic extremists.12
As in the case of the 9/11 attacks some three decades later, the December 1979
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a compete reversal of U.S. nuclear
proliferation and other security policy priorities.  President Carter’s National Security
Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, set the tone in a memo of December 26, 1979, when
he reportedly told the President that the United States had no choice but to repair its
then-tattered relations with Pakistan.  Reportedly, Brzezinski told the President that
gaining Pakistan’s support against the Soviet occupation “will require ...more
guarantees to it [Pakistan], more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security
policy cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy.”13  
The primacy of Cold War concerns remained the policy of the Reagan and
George H. W. Bush Administrations as well.  Congress supported this reordering of
U.S. policy priorities in 1981, by adding a new Section 620E of the FAA, which gave
the President qualified authority to waive for a period of six-years the provisions of
Section 669.  Congress supported a six-year, $3.2 billion program of economic and
military assistance, much like the five-year, $3 billion program requested by the Bush
Administration for the period FY2005-2009.  Despite Washington’s warnings and
contrary to repeated denials by the country’s military ruler, President Zia ul-Haq,
Pakistan not only continued to develop a nuclear weapons capability but companies
connected with its nuclear program were caught trying to export dual-use  materials
in violation of U.S. export control laws.
Failed Efforts to Reconcile U.S. Cold War and Nuclear
Proliferation Objectives: The 1985 “Pressler Amendment”
and the 1990 Aid Cutoff
In 1985, in the face of incontrovertible evidence that Pakistan was continuing
to develop a nuclear weapons capability, despite repeated denials by President Zia ul-
Haq, the Reagan Administration agreed to accept a new provision to U.S. foreign
assistance law, the so-called Pressler Amendment, Sec. 620E(e) of the FAA,
requiring the President to certify annually that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear
CRS-9
14 Peter Blood (Ed.), “The United States and the West,” in Pakistan: A Country Study.
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Research Completed April 1994.
[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pktoc.html]
15 For a brief chronology of U.S. nonproliferation policy and actions from 1976 to 1999, see
Institute for International Economics, “Chronology of Events,” Case Study 79-2, U.S. v.
Pakistan, Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism.
[http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/pakistan.htm].
16 CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E.
Rennack.
explosive device as a condition of U.S. assistance.  President Reagan and President
George H. W. made such findings for three years after passage of the amendment, but
each was successively more circumscribed.  In 1990, President Bush informed
Congress that he could no longer make such a certification, and that most economic
and all military assistance to Pakistan would be suspended.14
The 9/11 Commission’s references to Pakistan’s belief that past U.S. support
has been self-serving relate in large part to this development, even though Islamabad
had ample warning that its nuclear activities were putting its assistance in jeopardy.
Although the U.S. Government denied the charge, Pakistani commentators asserted
that the imposition of sanctions was directly related to 1989 withdrawal of the Soviet
army from Afghanistan, which made Pakistan no longer critical to U.S. regional
security policy.15
India and Pakistan’s May 1998 Nuclear Tests and the Decline
of Sanctions as a U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Approach 
When India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, Congress and the
Clinton Administration moved with a haste surprising to  many observers to waive
most of the economic sanctions required by U.S. foreign assistance law on both
countries.  The reaction of the President and Congress appeared to reflect several
factors, including a decline in the belief of the efficacy of sanctions once the tests
were a fait accompli, efforts by U.S. agricultural interests to prevent a loss of
markets, and the rising influence of the India caucus in Congress.  
 Legislation passed in July 1998 made Pakistan eligible for agricultural export
credits to buy U.S. winter wheat, while legislation signed into law in October that
year, “The India and Pakistan Relief Act,” gave the President the authority to waive
various economic sanctions for one year.  Later in October 1998 Congress made this
authority permanent and also extended it, with conditions, to include military
assistance, foreign military sales credits, and exports to high technology entities, in
the FY2000 Department of Defense appropriation.  India was able to take advantage
of many of these relaxations of sanctions but Pakistan remained ineligible for most
U.S. assistance on two other grounds: General Musharraf’s October 1999 military
coup; and the fact that Pakistan had fallen into arrears in its debt repayments to the
United States.16
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New U.S. Policy Reversal After 9/11
The 9/11 terrorist attacks, as in the case of the December 1979 Soviet  invasion
of Afghanistan, immediately changed Pakistan’s status from that of a problem
country with which the United States had strained relations to a critical regional ally,
but they put the U.S. Government once again at a disadvantage in dealing with
Pakistan’s nuclear activities.  A number of nonproliferation experts agree with the
critical importance of keeping Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials out of the
reach of terrorists, but they disagree with the Commission’s assumption that
President Musharraf is a sufficiently reliable partner, absent a more forthcoming
attitude from the Pakistani government on the activities of A. Q. Khan and his
network.  Others question the whether Pakistan is fully committed to fighting the war
against terrorism, let alone exercising nuclear restraint.
Among the most serious sources of concern is the well-documented past
involvement of some members of the Army’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
organization with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the possibility that some officers
retain sympathies with both groups.  In the words of one analyst, “...Pakistan’s
official alliance with the United States in the war on terror has only increased the
danger posed by al-Qaeda sympathizers within its nuclear establishment.”17  These
considerations are seen as a significant factor in Musharraf’s refusal to provide
adequate information about A. Q. Khan’s network.  Some observers argue that
without additional nonproliferation policy initiatives beyond those already adopted
by the Bush Administration, embracing and supporting Musharraf is an inadequate
response to danger posed by Pakistan’s nuclear establishment and its past role as
possibly the most important single source of nuclear proliferation to radical states.
Even if President Musharraf’s assurances are taken at face value, Pakistan
remains a significant source of proliferation risk.  Still outside the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, Pakistan is not bound by that treaty’s prohibitions on
nuclear weapon states transferring  nuclear-weapons related technology or materials
to any other state (or encouraging or assisting any state).  It also is not a member of
the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, a informal organization of countries producing nuclear
materials and technology that has established guidelines for nuclear exports.  While
Pakistani leaders have proclaimed that their nuclear weapons are secure and that
Pakistan has not been involved in selling or transferring nuclear weapons technology,
this claim is cast into doubt by the activities of Dr. A. Q. Khan over more than a
decade.  
Details on Pakistan’s Proliferation Activities18
Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan and several other scientists from the Khan Research
Laboratories sold nuclear technology from the 1980s through 2002 to several
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countries, including Iran, Libya, and North Korea.19  President Bush, in a speech that
focused on proliferation at the National Defense University on February 11, 2004,
outlined some aspects of Khan’s network:
! Khan led the network, operating mostly out of Pakistan
! A factory in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, manufactured centrifuge parts
(Scomi Precision Engineering)
! BSA Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman, ran SMB computers in Dubai
as a front company
! Network operatives in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa
purchased other components.
Much of the information about exactly what Khan sold has been gathered from
press accounts; although Khan reportedly signed a 12-page confession in early
February 2004, the text of that confession has not been made public.  Moreover, it
appears that the confession was written under pressure, which could further distort
the truth about Khan’s activities. 
Khan’s confession came at the end of a two-month investigation by the
Pakistani government into his activities, which was sparked by two related
proliferation investigations: Iran was pressured by the IAEA in the fall of 2003 to
reveal its foreign sources of centrifuge equipment, if only to support its argument that
the presence of highly enriched uranium came from foreign contamination and not
its own production of HEU; and Libya renounced its WMD programs in December
2003, revealing all its foreign sources of procurement.  Only in February 2004 did
Pakistan admit that nuclear technology was sold to those two countries.  The
Pakistani government and the North Korean government continue to deny any
transfers of nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea.  Yet, U.S.
officials have testified before Congress that Khan provided such technology to North
Korea.20  President Bush stated in his February 11th speech that “Khan and his
associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan’s older
centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models.”21 One
popular theory is that Pakistan bartered uranium enrichment technology for missile
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technology from North Korea, but President Musharraf has stated that “whatever we
bought from North Korea is with money.”22 
Khan reportedly sold a full range of technology — from blueprints and
components to full centrifuge assemblies, uranium hexafluoride feedstock, and,
reportedly, a nuclear weapon design.  Assistance to Iran began in the late 1980s and
continued at least until the mid-1990s.23  Assistance to Libya began in the early1990s
and continued into 2002.  Assistance to North Korea reportedly began in the mid-
1990s and may have continued until 2003.  However, a German intelligence
investigation concluded as long ago as 1991 that Iraq, and possibly Iran and North
Korea, obtained uranium melting information from Pakistan in the late 1980s.24  A
Pakistani official involved in Khan’s investigation reportedly said North Korea
ordered P-1 centrifuge components from 1997 to 2000.25  Beyond blueprints,
components, full assemblies of centrifuges, and low-enriched uranium, Libya also
received — startlingly — a nuclear weapons design.26  In the case of Iran and Libya,
Khan provided technology for an advanced centrifuge design (the P-2).27  There is no
confirmation that the nuclear weapon design Libya received in 2001 or 2002 is from
Pakistan, but some sources have reported that the design contained Chinese text and
step-by-step instructions for assembling a 1960s HEU implosion device, which could
CRS-13
28 “Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project to Pakistan Figure,” New York Times, February
4, 2004; and  “Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China,” Washington Post, February 15,
2004.
29 “Pakistan informed US of ‘personal’ nuclear technology transfer,” Agence France-Presse,
December 25, 2002 (based on report from Jiji Press news agency).  According to this and
other reports, the apparent  tip-off was tens of thousands of dollars deposited into the
personal bank accounts of  Pakistani scientists at Kahuta (Khan Research Laboratories).
30 “US Fears North Korea Could Gain Nuclear Capability Through Pakistan,” Financial
Times, June 1, 2001.
31  “North Korea Got a Little Help from Neighbors — Secret Nuclear Program Tapped
Russian Suppliers and Pakistani Know-How,” Wall Street Journal Europe, October 21,
2002;  “North Korean-Pakistan Collusion Said Limited to KRL and Missiles,” Nuclear Fuel,
June 25, 2001.
32  Weissman, Steve and Krosney, Herbert, The Islamic Bomb, Times Books: NY, 1981.
indicate that Khan passed on a design Pakistan is long-rumored to have received from
China.28 
Intelligence Issues
It is not possible to describe from open sources what the U.S. intelligence
community may have known, and when, about the A.Q. Khan network, but it is
possible to date some U.S. approaches to Pakistan on this matter from press reports.
In addition, it is possible to piece together hints of Pakistani collaboration in the
nuclear field with the three countries in question.  Finally, semi-annual, unclassified
reports to Congress on proliferation (so-called Section 721 reports) from 1997 to the
present may indicate what the intelligence community might have known.
U.S. officials reportedly approached Pakistani officials in 2000  with suspicions
about activities conducted by Khan Research Laboratory (KRL) scientists.  Pakistan
reportedly responded with an investigation, forcing Khan into early retirement in
March 2001.29  Shortly after Khan’s dismissal, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage
was quoted by the Financial Times as saying that “people who were employed by the
nuclear agency and have retired” could be spreading nuclear technology to other
states, including North Korea.30  However, a senior U.S. nonproliferation official
explained weeks later that Armitage’s statement led to confusion about the
cooperation; that it was really limited to missile cooperation.31  President Musharraf
told reporters in 2004 that the information U.S. officials gave him several years ago
was not specific enough for him to take action.
Reports of extensive official cooperation between Pakistan and the three
countries might also have informed the intelligence community’s assessment.
Pakistan reportedly signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran in 1986,
although the terms of that agreement are unknown, and Iranian scientists received
training in Pakistan in 1988.  Libyan funding of the Pakistani nuclear weapons
program in the early years long has been alleged, most notably in a 1981 book by
Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney called The Islamic Bomb.32  Finally, Pakistan’s
well-documented missile cooperation with North Korea beginning in the early 1990s,
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as well as A.Q. Khan’s dozen or so trips to North Korea were certainly known to the
intelligence community. 
Pakistan’s Absence in U.S. Intelligence Reports on
Proliferation
Despite the existence of intelligence information and rumors in the open
literature concerning significant Pakistani contacts with radical states known to be
seeking nuclear weapons, Congress has received little information on this issue in
unclassified reports from intelligence agencies.  The CIA’s semi-annual reports to
Congress on the acquisition of technology related to weapons of mass destruction
(Section 721 of FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act) do not highlight Pakistani
involvement in supplying WMD technology.  Pakistan is addressed as a country
acquiring technology from 1997 to the first half of 2002 and then no longer appears
in the reports as a country of proliferation concern.33  China, Russia, and North
Korea, are regularly included as key suppliers, but Pakistan has never been included
in this list.  The first time Pakistan is mentioned as a potential new supplier of
technology is for the report ending June 2000.”34 The report covering the period to
June 2002 addresses “Emerging State and Non-State Suppliers,” but  Pakistan or
A.Q. Khan are not mentioned by name. The text states that traditional recipients of
WMD technology might follow North Korea’s lead in supplying such technology to
other countries or non-state actors.  Additionally:
Even in cases where states take action to stem such transfers, there are growing
numbers of knowledgeable individuals or non-state purveyors of WMD-related
materials and technology who are able to act outside the constraints of
governments.  Such non-state actors are increasingly capable of providing
technology and equipment that previously could only be supplied directly by
countries with established capabilities.
South Asia is first mentioned as a region of key suppliers in the report covering
January to June 2003.  However, even in that report, there is no mention of a
connection between South Asia, Iran, Libya, or North Korea.  In the sections on Iran
and North Korea, there is no information on foreign suppliers, and the section on
Libya refers just to Libya seeking “technical exchanges” for dual-use equipment.
A.Q. Khan is finally mentioned in the Section 721 report ending December 2004
(publication mid-2004): 
The exposure of the A. Q. Khan network and its role in supplying nuclear
technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea illustrate one form of this threat, but
commercial purveyors of dual-use technologies who routinely seek to circumvent
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international export control regimes to deliver WMD-related equipment and
material to WMD-aspirant countries are of grave concern as well.35
Transfers to Iran.  By and large, the U.S. intelligence community appears not
to have identified Pakistan as a significant source of nuclear technology for Iran.
Concerns about a potential Iranian nuclear weapons program date back to the 1970s,
with a hiatus during the years of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1989).  With the end of that
war, the attention of the Iranian government turned back to recreating its nuclear
program, including the reactors at Bushehr.  When many governments were
persuaded not to participate in the project, Russia stepped in to fill the gap, and U.S.
attention focused on the nuclear technology Iran might glean from Russian scientists
and engineers.  Although centrifuge enrichment techniques were a concern, the
intelligence community had not focused on Pakistan as a particular supplier.  In the
Section 721 reports, Russia and China are repeatedly mentioned as suppliers to Iran’s
nuclear program.  From 1999 to 2001, the report admits that Iran has sought
technology from a variety of sources, but especially Russia.  Only in the report for
the first half of 2002 is there mention that the U.S. intelligence community suspects
Iran is interested in acquiring foreign fissile material and technology for weapons
development.
Transfers to Libya.  Although the U.S. intelligence community long had
suspected Libyan interest in developing nuclear weapons, most analysts attributed the
limited Libyan success to sanctions and lack of an indigenous scientific and
engineering base.  The IAEA reported in February 2004 that Libya began receiving
centrifuge components from A.Q. Khan in 1997.  Yet, the Section 721 reports did not
contain any text about a Libyan nuclear program until 2000.  Then, the report noted
that  the suspension of U.N. sanctions “has accelerated the pace of procurement
efforts in Libya’s drive to rejuvenate its ostensibly civilian nuclear program.”  That
report hinted that a nuclear cooperation agreement with Moscow would play a key
role.  Not until the report for January to June 2002 did the text note that Libya used
its secret services “to try to obtain technical information on the development of
WMD, including nuclear weapons.”  If this was referring to Libya’s procurement of
a nuclear weapons design from A.Q. Khan, it seems to imply less willingness by
Khan to provide the plans  than apparently was the case.  The reports for the last half
of 2002 and first half of 2003 only mention technical exchanges related to dual-use
equipment. 
Transfers to North Korea.  At the time the October 1994 Agreed
Framework with North Korea was negotiated, there was concern about, but scant
evidence of, North Korean interest in uranium enrichment.36  Reports of North
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Korea’s procurement of enrichment-related equipment, particularly from Pakistan,
date back to the mid-1980s (see above), but apparently U.S. intelligence agencies had
no evidence of an actual enrichment program.  Although a senior North Korean
official reportedly admitted that it has an enrichment program to U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly during a confrontational meeting in Pyongyang in
October 2002, Pyongyang has continued to deny it publicly.37 
It is clear that the U.S. intelligence community knew of multiple trips by A.Q.
Khan to North Korea, beginning in the mid-1990s.  Whether the intelligence
community attributed this to missile or nuclear cooperation is unclear, but the role
of KRL in both nuclear and missile technology could point to collaboration in one
or both areas.
In November 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency distributed a one-page,
unclassified white paper to Congress on North Korean enrichment capabilities, which
noted that the United States had “been suspicious that North Korea has been working
on uranium enrichment for several years,” and that it obtained clear evidence
“recently” that North Korea had begun constructing a centrifuge facility.38  The CIA
concluded that North Korea began a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program
in 2000.  Further, the paper noted that, in 2001, North Korea “began seeking
centrifuge-related materials in large quantities.  It also obtained equipment suitable
for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems.”  The CIA, the report said, had
“learned that the North is constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-
grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational —
which could be as soon as mid-decade.”39
One media report in 2002 cited Western officials as stating that Pakistan’s aid
included a complete design package for a centrifuge rotor assembly; another stated
that Pakistan had exported actual centrifuge rotors (2,000-3,000).40  In October 2002,
the Washington Post reported that North Korean efforts to procure high strength
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aluminum and significant construction activity tipped off the United States.41
Apparently, North Korea attempted to obtain materials from China, Japan, Pakistan,
Russia, and Europe, but Pakistan provided most of the assistance related to the rotors.
In the Section 721 reports to Congress, however, there has been little mention
of a North Korea-Pakistan connection in the nuclear area.  In the first report in 1997,
the text states that North Korea does not require significant outside assistance to
produce WMD.  In the 1998 report, there is no mention of any procurement related
to the nuclear program, and the report for the first half of 1999 states that
“Pyongyang sought to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in
its nuclear program, but we do not know of any procurement directly linked to the
nuclear weapons program.”  This statement was included in both reports for 2000,
but dropped in reports for 2001.  The report for the first half of 2002 notes that North
Korea began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities in 2001 but
makes no mention of where it procured those items.  The report covering the last half
of 2002 states that “we did not obtain clear evidence indicating that North Korea had
begun acquiring material and equipment for a centrifuge facility until mid-2002.”  
Although the intelligence community might place emphasis on “clear evidence”
and the threshold of a “centrifuge facility,” this admission comes after media
accounts in October and November 2002 of North Korea’s centrifuge procurement
from Pakistan and perhaps seven years after that procurement apparently began.
Only on February 24, 2004, weeks after Khan confessed to his activity, did CIA
Director George Tenet tell the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “We
...believe Pyongyang is pursuing a production-scale uranium enrichment program
based on technology provided by A.Q. Khan, which would give North Korea an
alternative route to nuclear weapons.” 
Role of A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani Government 
and Military42
Whether the Musharraf government can be trusted to go forward with the United
States as a security partner, let alone a Major Non-NATO Ally, while not putting the
United States further at risk from nuclear proliferation, depends in part on the degree
of culpability of the Pakistani government and military in A. Q. Khan’s activities.
Even if, as has been alleged by the Pakistani government, Khan’s aggressive
marketing of nuclear materials and technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya was
designed to further Khan’s outsized ego and financial interests, he could not have
functioned without some level of cooperation by Pakistani military personnel, who
maintained tight security around the key nuclear facilities, and possibly civilian
officials as well.  This section discusses the available information on Khan’s role and
assesses the credibility of Pakistan’s denial that his activities were authorized or
supported at the policy level in Islamabad.
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Khan’s Motives
A. Q. Khan’s celebrity status and the degree to which he enriched himself by his
activities have been cited by some as evidence that his activities were not government
policy.  In return for assistance provided by Khan and laboratory director Farooq
Mohammed (a close associate of Khan), Iran allegedly funneled millions of dollars
into foreign bank accounts held by the two men.  Reportedly, Khan then used the
money to purchase valuable real estate in both Pakistan and Dubai.43  Khan
reportedly made numerous trips to Tehran to share his expertise on uranium
enrichment procedures.  Compensation also may have included the gift of a villa on
the Caspian Sea.  Khan denies ever having traveled to Iran.44  One unnamed aide to
Musharraf reportedly said that “Khan had a completely blank check” while in charge
of the Khan Research Laboratory (KRL).  “He could do anything.  He could go
anywhere.  He could buy anything at any price.”45
Khan’s reputation as a Pakistani “national hero” appears be manufactured,
produced at the expense of several other Pakistani scientists who played equal or
greater roles in the country’s nuclear weapons program.  One leading American
expert called Khan an “egomaniac” who had mastered the press  to transform his
image to that of national hero.46  Although Khan apparently did make Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons program possible by illegally acquiring the plans for an uranium
enrichment facility, this is only one — albeit a critical one — of many steps required
in the production of nuclear weapons.  According to one source, much of the nuclear
weapons production process was overseen by a lead scientist at the Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission (PAEC), which did not enjoy KRL’s high public profile.  That
scientist, Samar Mubarikmand, may have known of Khan’s activities and may even
have used Khan and KRL as a decoy to divert attention from PAEC, where the most
critical work on nuclear weapons was being carried out.47 
Whether President Musharraf’s delicate treatment of Khan following the
revelations of his activities reflects some level of official culpability is arguable.  It
has been pointed out that, despite evidence that he had committed serious breaches
of Pakistani law, Khan was allowed (by Musharraf himself) to keep the many
millions of ill-gotten dollars, while two former elected Prime Ministers had been
exiled and barred from political office for corruption charges involving far less
money.48 
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Likewise, it appears that the Pakistani government was, at a very minimum,
incredibly lax in responding to rumors of his activities.  Even before Pakistan’s May
1998 nuclear test, several scientists working with Khan at KRL reportedly warned
government officials that Khan was involved in suspicious activities.49  There have
been reports that Khan’s daughter smuggled out of Pakistan documents and a tape-
recorded statement indicating that senior Pakistani military officers, including
Musharraf, were aware of her father’s proliferation activities.50
 
On the other hand, Khan’s self-promoted reputation as the father of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons program created a motive not only for overlooking his
transgressions, but also for seeking to share in his reflected glory.  At a formal dinner
marking Khan’s March 2001 retirement from KRL, President Musharraf lavished
praise on the famed metallurgist: “Dr. Khan and his team toiled and sweated, day and
night, against all odds and obstacles, against international sanctions and sting
operations, to create, literally out of nothing, with their bare hands, the pride of
Pakistan’s nuclear capability.”51  Given Musharraf’s relative unpopularity, some
observers suggest that his lavishing  praise on Khan does not necessarily imply
approval or complicity in his proliferation activities.
Pakistani Government Role52
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Assistant Secretary of State
Christina Rocca reportedly met with Musharraf in Islamabad in October 2003 to
present him with substantive evidence implicating Khan and several other scientists
in a proliferation ring.  One unnamed Pakistani official said that U.S. intelligence on
Khan’s movements was so detailed that it seemed a tracking device had been planted
on his body.53  In the same month, the network began to unravel at the other end:
centrifuge equipment shipments to Libya were intercepted in the Mediterranean in
October and by December 2003, Libyan leader Qadaffi renounced his weapons of
mass destructions programs.  Libya revealed, to the United States and to others, the
assistance that Khan had provided.
On December 11, 2003, a Pakistani daily reported that two senior KRL
scientists had “gone missing under mysterious circumstances.”  Later, it became
known that laboratory director Farooq Mohammed had been the first Pakistani
nuclear scientist to be “detained” for questioning by government authorities on
November 27, following the delivery to Islamabad of an IAEA letter on Iranian
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uranium enrichment facilities.54  Islam-ul Haq, a director at KRL, reportedly was
picked up for questioning as he was dining at Khan’s home on January 17, 2004.55
As the investigation expanded in January 2004, many citizens criticized the
Pakistani government for making scapegoats of lower-level scientists to “appease”
the United States.  Said the relative of one detained KRL scientist, “It’s all to praise
or make happy the U.S.A. by framing innocent people.”  Opposition political groups
were near-unanimous in their dismissal of proliferation charges, claiming they were
part of U.S.-led effort to denuclearize Pakistan; they typically portrayed Musharraf’s
cooperation with the United States on this and other issues as capitulation to a
foreign power.56
On January 20, Pakistan barred all scientists working on its nuclear weapons
program from leaving the country.  The officially-stated reason was to ensure that
these individuals would be available for questioning, but many believed that the true
purpose was to prevent them from talking to foreign investigators or journalists.57
One day later, Khan himself was fired from his position as science advisor to the
prime minister, and ensuing reports indicated that Khan was under house arrest in the
Pakistani capital.  On February 1, Khan reportedly signed a detailed confession
indicating that he had provided Iran, North Korea, and Libya with uranium
enrichment technologies and materials.58
After conceding that some Pakistani scientists had been involved in
proliferation, Musharraf suggested that personal gain was the central motivation, but
other motives have been mentioned.  When asked about motive, one unnamed senior
Pakistani official did not mention greed at all, but rather indicated that Khan had
transferred technologies to divert attention from the Pakistan’s nuclear program, as
well as to bolster Islamic solidarity.59  Key Pakistani investigators reportedly have
opined that Khan was motivated to defy the West, make himself a hero to the Islamic
world, and gain wealth.60  Khan’s proliferation ring is reported to have earned $100
million in deals with Libya alone.61
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Pakistani Military Role?
In February 2004, as the Khan story was breaking in the international media, the
Washington Post reported that Khan had told a friend and a senior Pakistani
investigator that top Pakistani military officers, including Gen. Musharraf, had
known about Khan’s assistance to North Korea’s uranium enrichment efforts.   Khan
also reportedly told investigators that General Mirza Aslam Beg, the former Army
Chief (1988-1991), was aware of similar assistance being provided to Iran and that
“two other Army chiefs, in addition to Musharraf, knew and approved of his efforts
on behalf of North Korea.”62
Publicly, Khan accepted all of the blame.  In his televised confession to the
Pakistani people, Khan sought to “atone for some of the anguish and pain” he had
caused by offering his “deepest regrets and unqualified apologies to a traumatized
nation.”  He took “full responsibility” for the proliferation “activities” and
emphasized that the Islamabad government had “never ever” authorized them.63  On
the next day, in what appeared to many to be part of a scripted unfolding of events,
President Musharraf granted and upheld a recommendation from his cabinet that
Khan not be subjected to any proliferation-related criminal prosecution.  Yet within
a week, the Pakistani government announced that the pardon was “conditional” and
“specific to charges made so far.”64
Subsequent actions by the Pakistani government underscored doubts that Khan
could have operated without some level of support by military officers and officials,
whether acting on their own or carrying out government policy.  Following Khan’s
public confession, the Musharraf government announced that it had arrested at least
five scientists and administrative officials from KRL, including Farooq Mohammed
and Islam-ul Haq.65  On February 11, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister said that “nobody
would be spared” in the ongoing criminal investigation, including Khan.  On the
same day, four civilian scientists and three retired military officers——including
KRL department heads and brigadiers in charge of security there——were formally
charged with proliferation-related crimes.66 
President Musharraf himself raised more questions when, on February 9, he
acknowledged that he had long suspected that Khan was involved in proliferation
activities, but argued that the United States had failed to provide convincing evidence
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until the fall of 2003.67  Why Musharraf had not followed up on his own alleged
suspicions has not been explained.
Politically, the Khan affair put President Musharraf in a difficult position.
When the Pakistani Parliament met on February 16, opposition parties accused the
government of covering-up the military’s role in proliferating, humiliating Khan,
appeasing the United States, and by-passing the country’s elected representatives.68
Some Pakistani commentators argued that the Pakistani state could in no way
be held accountable for the actions of Khan himself.  They pointed to Khan’s
allegedly “total control” of KRL, the alleged fact the facilities were off-limits to both
civilian politicians and the ISI, and an absence of evidence that Khan’s actions were
ever transformed into KRL policy.69
General Beg, in particular, has long been suspected of having anti-U.S. and pro-
Iranian tendencies.  Henry Rowan, at the time a U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense,
has related a January 1990 meeting with Gen. Beg , who, he says, “said something
like, ‘If we don’t get adequate support from the U.S., then we may be forced to share
nuclear technology with Iran.’”70  Another source attributes a similar statement by
General Beg to late 1990, following the decision by President George H. W. Bush
that he could not make the required certification to Congress that Pakistan did not
have nuclear weapons, thus invoking  the “Pressler Amendment,” Sec. 620E(e) of the
Foreign Assistance Act, 1961, as amended, requiring a cutoff of military and
economic assistance to Pakistan.71 
 Beg reportedly has strongly denied having ever having had control over A. Q.
Khan — a role he assigned to former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990,
1993-1996) and former President Ghulam Ishak Khan (1988-1993)72  The
accusations concerning Benazir Bhutto and Ghulam Ishaq Khan have been made by
others, as well.  Former Pakistani President Farooq Leghari (1993-1997) insisted that
he, former President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and both former Prime Ministers Nawaz
Sharif and Benazir Bhutto were fully informed about the country’s nuclear weapons
program as “nothing was kept secret from us.”  Leghari claimed that he had no
knowledge of proliferation activities while in office and put responsibility squarely
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on the shoulders of A.Q. Khan.73  Benazir Bhutto’s chief defense advisor from 1988
to 1990, the late Gen. Imtiaz, reportedly pressured Khan to transfer out-dated P-I
centrifuges to Iran.74
Others find Beg’s denials less than credible.  Addressing Gen. Beg’s statements
denying knowledge of transfers to Iran in the 1980s and 1990s, one former Pakistani
nuclear scientist claimed that “nothing moves in the Pakistani nuclear spectrum
without the knowledge of the chief of army staff.”75  Beg himself has claimed that the
Pakistani Army has “never been in control” of the country’s nuclear weapons
program except during periods of military rule.  He insisted that the ultimate
authority was always the “Chief Executive”——in this case Benazir Bhutto.  Bhutto
herself claimed that Khan could not have been acting alone and that senior
government or military officials were seeking to cover-up their own complicity.  She
even asserted that, as Prime Minister, she had turned down several requests by
military officials and scientists to export Pakistan’s nuclear technology.76 
An aide to then-PM Nawaz Sharif claimed that Beg approached him in 1991
with a proposal to sell nuclear technology to Iran.  Reportedly, former U.S.
Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, said that Beg told him that same year of an
“understanding” with the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps that Pakistan
would help Iran with its nuclear program in return for conventional weapons and oil.
Beg’s alleged motive was to form a “grand alliance” of Islamic countries with the
ability to resist American power in the wake of the U.S.-led military successes in
Kuwait and Iraq in early 1991.  Beg denies all claims that he sought to provide
nuclear assistance to Iran.77
The public reaction to the accusations against Khan was predictably nationalistic
and anti-American.  Many Pakistani observers accused the “foreign media” of bias
in singling out Pakistan while ignoring the roles played by the citizens of other
countries, including those in the West.  They also criticized the IAEA and the United
States for turning a blind eye to the nuclear weapons programs of Israel and India.78
Representative media commentary in Pakistan warned of a “clear and present danger
that the West is threatening to dismantle [Pakistan’s] nuclear program” through the
establishment of “intrusive inspection regimes.”  Former ISI chief Lt. Gen. Hamid
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Gul suggested that the United States would “exploit” the situation to gain joint
custody of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons “to the total satisfaction of Israel.”79
Seemingly in contradiction to the nationalistic and anti-Western response, a
number of politicians and analysts from across Pakistan’s political spectrum were
quick to suggest that Khan was “falling on his sword” to protect others in the
Pakistani government and military who also were involved in proliferation activities,
perhaps even including Musharraf himself.80  Others suggested that the series of
events leading up to Khan’s confession and pardon appeared to have been tightly
scripted, and may have been privately endorsed by a U.S. government keen to protect
a key counterterrorism ally.81
Bush Administration Statements
The Bush Administration has maintained that “there was no evidence that the
top officials of the Pakistani government were complicit in or approved of [Khan’s]
proliferation activities.”  The Bush Administration has found insufficient evidence
to trigger U.S. nonproliferation laws, even though U.S. officials claim neither to have
asked for access to Khan nor believed that such access was necessary.82  Senior U.S.
officials have insisted that the United States is receiving the cooperation it needs
from Pakistan, but in testimony to Congress on April 29, 2004, Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage said that the Administration was “impatient for even greater
efforts from President Musharraf.”83  In a feature article on December 26, 2004, the
New York Times reported that the Administration had received little new information
from Pakistan to its questions about where Khan obtained the plans for a nuclear
weapon.  The article also maintained, based on unnamed sources, that the
Administration had not gained access to his chief assistant, Buhari Sayed Abu Tahir,
who has been jailed in Malaysia as a consequence of the discovery of Khan’s
network.84
  
In view of the domestic political sensitivity of the issue for President Musharraf
other statements by U.S. officials also appear designed to minimize American
concern about the light treatment given A. Q. Khan by Musharraf, despite the gravity
of his actions,.  Responding to a question during a CNN interview about President
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Bush’s claim during the September 30, 2004 presidential debate, that “the A. Q.
Khan network has been brought to justice,” National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice reportedly noted the difficult situation for President Musharraf and that “A. Q.
Khan, in a sense, has been brought to justice because he is out of the business that he
loved most.”  Rice reportedly stated further “And if you don’t think national
humiliation is justice for what he did, I think it is.  He’s nationally humiliated.”85  
Rather than publicly demanding that the Musharraf government make a full
revelation of A. Q. Khan’s activities,  Secretary of State Colin Powell and other State
Department officials insisted that the United States should play no role in judging
Musharraf’s handling of the matter.  A State Department briefer on February 5, 2004,
said he was “impressed by the seriousness of the investigation” being conducted in
Pakistan and expected that Pakistan would share with the international community
the information that is gleaned though the investigation.   Secretary of State Colin
Powell explicitly described the investigation as “a Pakistani internal matter” at a
press conference in Islamabad on March 18, 2004, though he also said that he was
confident that the Pakistani authorities would provide “full disclosure” so that the
United States and Pakistan could work together to completely eliminate Khan’s
network.86  Many Pakistani analysts voiced their approval of the conclusion that
Khan’s activities breached no international laws, thus justifying Musharraf’s
“prerogative” to pardon.87
Other observers have not expressed the same level of confidence that the
investigation would achieve the stated objectives.  The Director-General of the IAEA
called Khan “the tip of an iceberg” and claimed that his case “raises more questions
than it answers. ... Dr. Khan was not working alone.”88  A New York Times editorial
asserted that “Pakistan’s military — and that means General Musharraf — was,
without question, aware of and part of this illicit and perilous commerce.  Yet the
Bush administration’s reaction,” the editorial continued, “has been one of grateful
acceptance.”89  Indian reactions were predictably dismissive of the Khan pardon as
a “grand charade” designed to protect the Pakistani military.  Many were equally
discomfited by the Bush administration’s quickness to call Khan’s activities an
“internal matter.”90 
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Issues Concerning the Viability of the Musharraf
Government As a Long-Term U.S. Security Partner91
The critical importance of gaining cooperation against terrorism has been the
Bush Administration’s main justification for largely setting aside U.S.
nonproliferation concerns in the case of Pakistan.  Not only does the United States
need Pakistani cooperation, but Musharraf’s survival has been seen by both the
Administration and the 9/11 Commission as an essential requirement for maintaining
and increasing Pakistani cooperation.   Given the troubled history of U.S.-Pakistan
security cooperation, the 9/11 Commission Report emphasizes, in particular, the
necessity of avoiding a repetition of the past cycle of engagement, disengagement,
and reengagement with Pakistan.  The following section addresses the stability of the
Musharraf government and the prospects for a continuation of current Pakistani
policy should President Musharraf leave the scene, for whatever reason.
Near-Term U.S. Security Needs Versus Longer Term Human
Rights and Democracy Goals
U.S. interest in Pakistani democratization exists in tandem with the perceived
need to have a stable and effectively-administered ally in the international anti-
terrorism coalition.  However, while many observers believe that U.S. interests in
combating terrorism and weapons proliferation in South Asia entail a “trade-off”
with regard to other concerns, some contend that the human rights situation in
Pakistan may itself be a crucial aspect of the incidence of terrorism and religious
extremism.92  Congressional oversight of U.S.-Pakistan relations in a March 2003
hearing included Member expressions of concern about problems with Pakistani
democratization and the danger of the United States “giving full recognition to a
military takeover” through continuous waivers of coup-related aid restrictions.93  The
military continues to dominate Pakistan’s centralized decision making process and,
while in office, Prime Minister Jamali referred to President Musharraf as being his
“boss.”94  
While it is possible to argue that Pakistan is more democratic since the October
2002 elections, many analysts note that the country’s democratic institutions and
processes are inflexible and unaccommodating of dissent, and they see Pakistan’s
political parties seriously weakened in recent years, with the military’s influence
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correspondingly more profound.95  Moreover, numerous commentators reject the 9/11
Commission’s “best hope” label for Musharraf himself as myopic and repetitive of
past U.S. reliance on Pakistani military regimes, especially in light of their view that
Pakistan’s allegedly decreasing political stability is rooted in Musharraf’s policies
and in the personal support he receives from the United States.96
President Musharraf remains generally a popular figure in Pakistan, but he has
been an object of hatred for  Islamic radicals, including those affiliated with domestic
and international terrorist organizations.  A March 2004 survey found that 86% of
Pakistanis view Musharraf favorably (with 60% viewing him very favorably), but
65% also said that they support Osama bin Laden. Musharraf’s government depends
on an alliance of six Islamist parties, which use the acronyms MMA (“United Action
Front,” in English) to maintain a majority in the national parliament.  The same
alliance controls the assemblies in  two provinces  bordering Afghanistan —
Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).97 The support of the
Islamist parties has been brought into question by Musharraf’s decision to  break his
commitment to step down as Army commander at the end of the year, a promise he
made in 2003 to secure the support of a six Islamic parties in parliament.
  
The bargain struck with the Islamic parties served both to maintain a governing
majority in the national assembly and to secure passage of an amendment, the 17th to
the Pakistani constitution, which, among other things, legitimatized Musharraf’s
1999 military coup.98   The response to Musharraf’s indication that he would remain
Army chief until the end of his presidential term in 2007 suggests that his popularity
may have declined.  Musharraf has justified keeping his uniform as necessary to
maintain stability.99  
Overall, the events of September 11, 2001 and after appear to have assisted
Musharraf in strengthening his grip on power.  One former Pakistani political advisor
and diplomat notes that, “Each of Pakistan’s patriarchs have based their claim to
power on grounds of U.S. support and their own ability to provide good
governance.”100  The perceived U.S. need for a stable and reliable regional ally in its
ongoing counterterrorism efforts in South Asia have some analysts concluding that
Musharraf remains in a position to take further domestic political advantage of
current geopolitical dynamics.  
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Many analysts believe the advance of democracy and civil society in Pakistan
is key to the long-term success of stated U.S. policy in the region, although the 9/11
Commission Report implies that in the short run, anyway, supporting Musharraf is
an absolute necessity.  At a July 2004 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, all three private witnesses, who were veteran Pakistan watchers, agreed
about the potential problems inherent in a perceived U.S. preference for bolstering
Musharraf’s authoritarian leadership at the expense of Pakistan’s democratic
institutions and civil society.  One witness offered that Musharraf is best seen as a
“marginal satisfier” who will do only the minimum expected of him. He
recommended that, “The United States must alter the impression our support for
Pakistan is essentially support for Musharraf.”101  
Doubts about Musharraf’s popularity have been echoed by a leading Pakistani
analyst, who contends that all of the Pakistani president’s major policy shifts after
September 2001 have come through compulsion by external pressure or events and
that, while the direction of Pakistan’s policy change has been appropriate, “the
momentum of change is too slow and awkward and unsure to constitute a critical and
irreversible mass.”102  Many leading Pakistani commentators insist that only by
allowing the country’s secular political parties fully into the system can the country
realize stable and enduring democracy.103
American policy makers, however, generally agree with the 9/11 Commission
that U.S. interests are for the time being best served by the presence of a strong and
secure Islamabad leadership.  Thus, while early optimism about Musharraf’s potential
as a reformer has waned considerably, there are those who still conclude that the
existence of an unstable and possibly Islamicized or failed state between Afghanistan
and India — a state in possession of nuclear weapons — is a far less desirable
circumstance than the present one in which a powerful and secular military institution
maintains a reasonable degree of order in Pakistan.  For some, this argument has
become less persuasive as the country’s law-and-order situation has deteriorated in
2004.  Pakistan’s fragile democratic institutions are under continuous threat from the
authoritarian influences of the country’s powerful military and quasi-feudal economic
structures.  Given a stated U.S. position that, “Democratic institutions are required
if Pakistan is to thrive economically and to develop further into an enlightened and
moderate Muslim state,”104  Pakistan’s domestic political developments likely will
be closely monitored by the United States.
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Succession Issues
An acute concern of many U.S. policy makers is the issue of political succession
in Pakistan, especially as it relates to potential domestic upheaval and control of that
country’s nuclear arsenal.105  The constitutionally designated successor to the
President is the Chairman of the Senate, currently a member of the military-friendly
Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) party and Musharraf loyalist
Muhammadmian Soomro, an international banker from a well-known Sindhi family.
It is the President’s prerogative to appoint Army Chiefs.  The consensus view among
analysts has the Pakistani military maintaining its substantive administration of the
country in the event of President Musharraf’s premature removal.  The nature of such
a potential removal likely would influence the scope and intensity of military
governance.  For example, if Musharraf were removed through violent means, it is
quite possible that the army would declare martial law and rule directly for a period.
In any case, it is widely assumed that the hierarchical solidarity and historic
professionalism of Pakistan’s military would result in its continued effectiveness as
a stabilizing force, at least in the short- and perhaps middle-term.  Despite the
apparent sturdiness of the military’s command structure, there remains widespread
pessimism about the ability of political institutions built by Musharraf to survive his
sudden removal, and doubts remain about the viability of political succession
mechanisms.106
After his September 2001 policy shift, Musharraf moved to purge pro-Taliban
Islamists from the higher ranks of the military.  Vice-Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
Gen. Mohammed Yusuf, a moderate, was seen as the most likely successor to the
position of COAS, although some observers identified the Chairman of the Joints
Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen. Mohammad Aziz, as a contender.  While considered
fully loyal to the army, of Pakistan’s 30 highest ranking officers, Gen. Aziz may have
been the only remaining with meaningful links to Islamist groups.107  Both Gen.
Yusuf and Gen. Aziz retire in October 2004.  President Musharraf has named two
close allies to replace them:  Lt. Gen. Ahsan Salim Hayat, the Karachi Corps
Commander, will be the new Vice-COAS and the senior-most army officer after
Musharraf; ISI chief Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, a moderate who oversaw the removal
of pro-Taliban officers from Pakistan’s intelligence service after September 2001, has
been appointed Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Committee.  Gen. Hayat
narrowly escaped assassination in a bloody June 2004 attack on his motorcade, an
event which appeared to confirm his status as an enemy of Islamic extremists.  The
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newly-promoted four-star general is believed to be one of Musharraf’s closest allies
in the military and his most likely successor as Army Chief.108
Policy Discussion:  More Constraints Than Options109
Whatever the current policy of the Musharraf government — Islamabad insists
that it is not involved in proliferation activities — Pakistan continues to be an
established  source of vertical (new levels of capability) proliferation and a potential
source of onward horizontal proliferation (transfers to other states.)  Moreover, if not
carefully handled, U.S. policies aimed at strengthening Pakistan militarily could
unintentionally lead to the breakdown of the current unstable nuclear deterrence
situation between Pakistan and India, with catastrophic consequences.
Given that imposition of sanctions seems unlikely in the current situation, the
Bush administration appears to be focusing on improving the global community’s
ability to interdict dangerous shipments through the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI), and in shrinking access worldwide to capabilities needed to produce fissile
material crucial for nuclear weapons.  In a speech on February 11, 2004, President
Bush proposed a mix of measures to respond to the threat of the nuclear black
market.110  In addition to expanding interdiction efforts (under the Proliferation
Security Initiative) to “shut down labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets,”
the President also proposed criminalizing proliferation in a new UN Security Council
resolution (UNSCR 1540); expanding cooperative threat reduction measures to states
like Libya; banning enrichment and reprocessing capabilities beyond those states that
already have them; making the Additional Protocol (to the NPT) a prerequisite for
nuclear-related imports; and creating a special committee at the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate compliance.
 In June 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally
(MNNA) as provided for by Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended.  Thailand, another important antiterrorism ally, was given the same status
in 2003.  The designation, long enjoyed by Japan, South Korea, Australia and other
allies,  makes Pakistan eligible for expedited access to excess defense articles and
other privileges.111  The designation also appears related to Pakistan’s decision to
purchase several major weapons systems.  On November 16, 2004, the Department
of Defense notified Congress of possible military sales to Pakistan of six Orion P-3C
maritime patrol aircraft, 2,000 TOW-2A missiles, 14 TOW Fly-to-Buy missiles, six
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PHALANX Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), and an upgrade of six earlier models
of the Phalanx shipboard anti-missile defense systems, along with associated
equipment for all of the systems.112  
Thus far Pakistan appears to have been stymied in its effort to gain approval to
purchase about 20 used F-16 fighter-bombers from the Belgian Air Force.  (Any
resale or transfer of U.S. controlled technology requires U.S. approval.)  Press reports
in early December 2004, following a visit to Washington and a meeting between
President Musharraf and President Bush, indicate that the Pakistani leader did not get
the answer he wanted on the aircraft.113 
As if to underscore the possibility that U.S. arms sales to Pakistan could be
destabilizing, Pakistan tested a Shaheen nuclear-capable short-range (700 kilometers)
ballistic missile on December 8, 2004, on the same day that Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld arrived in New Delhi for meetings with Indian leaders where he was
expected to discuss U.S. arms sales and military cooperation with India.  Reportedly,
one of the most important items on the Indian agenda was to acquire the U.S. Patriot
ballistic missile defense systems (PAC -2 and/or PAC-3), and to explore the
possibility of obtaining approval to acquire Israel’s Arrow battlefield missile defense
system which includes U.S.-licensed components and technology.  India reportedly
expressed strong objections to the sale of the P-3C surveillance aircraft and the TOW
anti-tank missiles.114
Within the constraints imposed by dependence on antiterrorist cooperation from
Pakistan, U.S. policymakers still may have several options for pursuing a stronger
antiproliferation policy while  maintaining Pakistan’s status as a “front line” state in
the war against terrorism.
Option 1 — Fully Support Musharraf on Condition of
Continued Counterterrorism Support
While the United States may appear to have little choice but to support
Musharraf, the degree of U.S. support matters greatly.  One option is to support
Pakistan fully, conditioned only on continued cooperation in the counterterrorism
effort.  The 9/11 Commission Report argues that President Musharraf is “the best
hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan” and an advocate of “enlightened
moderation.”  The Commission recommends that “As the United States makes fresh
commitments now, it should make promises that it is prepared to keep for years,”
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provided “Pakistan’s leaders are prepared to make difficult choices of their own.”115
The advantages of this course are that it reduces Pakistani suspicion that, in the
words of the 9/11 Commission Report, the United States views Pakistan as an “ally
of convenience.”  The underlying rationale for this option is that the more confidence
that President Musharraf has in the U.S. commitment to Pakistan, the more ready he
will be to confront terrorism.
For several reasons the risks of this option may be high.  This option does not
fully address the limits of Musharraf’s authority, and it ties Pakistan’s “hard choices”
to the fight against extremists,” not its nuclear behavior.  Despite its strong support
for the Musharraf government, the Bush Administration has not yet obtained full
Pakistani cooperation against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. If Musharraf should adopt
a zero-tolerance policy of shutting down all terrorist networks he risks a possibly
fatal backlash both from the ISI and militants carrying out an insurgency in Indian-
occupied Kashmir, as well as the loss of support from his political allies among the
Islamist parties.
Even if Musharraf or a comparable military successor continues to maintain
political dominance for the next few years, there is no absolute guarantee that
Pakistan will continue its “front line” status against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  Much
could depend on Pakistan’s volatile political situation.  Already, Islamist political
forces are impatient with Musharraf’s vision of a moderate, modernizing Islamic
state and measures, however incomplete to suppress domestic jihadists in Baluchistan
and the Northwest Frontier Province, and terrorist groups operating in Kashmir.    
Even now, some in the Pakistani hierarchy are not prepared to support U.S.
policy to the point of compromising, in their view, Pakistan’s long -term fundamental
interests.  Some analysts judge it unlikely that the ISI would ever completely alienate
the Taliban. Evidence that more than one assassination attempt against Musharraf
involved collusion between radical Islamists, possibly Al Qaeda operatives, and
lower level Pakistani Air Force personnel, underscores that there are ideological
fissures in the regime.  Radical political change may be unlikely under present
circumstances, but a violent Islamist campaign against the government or an internal
coup cannot be completely ruled out.
Questions about Musharraf’s ability to control events appear to be underscored
by reported rumors that he has been engaged in secret negotiations on a power
sharing agreement with the leaders of the two previous governing parties, the
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim
League (PML), led by Nawaz Sharif.  Under the rumored deal, Musharraf would
remain President at least until 2007, but he would give up his position as Chief of the
Army Staff, a move also demanded by his current MMA allies, and hold fresh
parliamentary elections in 2005.  Both Bhutto and Sharif had alternated as civilian
prime ministers during the 1990s, but both had been overthrown by military coups
and both are now in exile.116  While such a development would likely be viewed as
a positive step towards democratization, a decision by Musharraf to end his alliance
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with the MMA could provoke a new political crisis.  Moreover, the very fact that the
arrangement has been rumored raises questions about Pakistan’s stability.
At the same time, questions remain about Pakistan’s nuclear policies.  The U.S.
Government cannot verify the Musharraf government’s assurances that Khan’s
nuclear sales were not state policy and would not be repeated.  Moreover, Pakistan
has firmly ruled out any limits on its vertical proliferation activities, i.e., building
more nuclear weapons and deploying more capable ballistic missiles.  After the
revelations concerning A. Q. Khan’s covert sales of nuclear technology and materials
to North Korea, Iran, and Libya, the Musharraf government assured the United States
that the incidents were not state policy and would not be repeated.  This policy seems
consistent with the current alignment of Pakistan with U.S. antiterrorism policy, but
new circumstances could change Pakistan’s nuclear calculus.  No matter what the
United States does at this point it will have to live with consequences of its past
inability or failure to check Pakistan’s proliferation and the potential fragility of the
stability and moderation offered by Musharraf. 
Option 2 — Multilateral Nonproliferation Strategies
This approach, recommended in the 9/11 report, involves  concentrating on the
recipient or end-user side of the equation as the most effective way to deny nuclear
weapons and materials to terrorists.  That is, it emphasized measures to seek to
eliminate global supply networks rather than penalizing Pakistan or even demanding
a full account of A. Q. Khan’s activities and networks. 
As noted above, the Bush administration appears to be focusing on improving
the global community’s ability to interdict dangerous shipments through the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and in shrinking access worldwide to
capabilities needed to produce fissile material crucial for nuclear weapons.  In a
speech on February 11, 2004, President Bush proposed a mix of measures to respond
to the threat of the nuclear black market.117 The President has proposed expanding
interdiction efforts under the PSI, which aims to  “shut down labs, to seize their
materials, [and] to freeze their assets.”  The multi-national agreement was announced
by President Bush in May 2003 and inaugurated in Paris, in September  2003, by the
United States, eight European NATO allies, Australia and Japan.  Additional
countries have joined since.  Undersecretary of State John Bolton has described the
initiative, which now enjoys the support of some 60 or more countries, as “foremost
among President Bush’s efforts to stop WMD proliferation.”118 
The 9/11 Commission recommends expanding the PSI, including persuading
Russia and China to join, and providing participating member countries with NATO
alliance “intelligence and planning resources.”119  It is probably crucial to include
Russia and China to make the PSI effective, but it will also be important to include,
where possible, supplier states.  While it is doubtful that Iran or North Korea would
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agree to restrictions, making sure that Pakistan no longer engages in proliferation
activities would appear critical to the effectiveness of the PSI.  From this perspective,
critics charge that it is past time that Pakistan reinforced its promises with concrete
measures.  
Proliferation specialists have welcomed the PSI but say that its potential is
limited by several factors, including its “ad hoc” nature, which depends on the
political will of participating countries.  Some critics view the PSI as a supplement
to a more robust nonproliferation regime and one which needs to be bolstered by
changes in international law.  This includes adopting amendments to the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(1988),  and the adoption of a draft U.N. resolution that would provide for
interdiction activities under Section VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows the
Security Council to authorize sanctions or the use of force to compel states to comply
with its resolutions.120  Although UNSC Resolution 1540 was adopted under Section
VII of the U.N. Charter, it was not specific either about interdiction or penalties.
It may be possible to ban the further spread of enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities without a new treaty such as a fissile material production cutoff treaty
(FMCT), but new voluntary agreements remain difficult to enforce.  The international
community is already working on making the Additional Protocol (to full-scope
nuclear safeguards agreements) a prerequisite for nuclear imports through the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, but Pakistan is not a member of the NSG.  Finally, for
political reasons, it is unlikely that the IAEA will create a special committee for
compliance, although Director General ElBaradei has set up a study group to evaluate
several recommendations that have emerged as a result of the exposure of the Khan
network.
In testimony before Congress one non-official witness deemed that efforts to
combat nuclear proliferation remained the “stunted pillar” of the President’s National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.  The witness, Joseph Cirincione
of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, compared FY2004 funding for
non-proliferation programs at less than $2 billion, with $41 billion for Homeland
Security and $81 billion for military counter-proliferation efforts, including ballistic
missile defense and the war in Iraq.121
Effectively shutting down the black market trade in nuclear technology,
materials, and components may be possible with adequate cooperation from host
governments, but this objective would be easier to accomplish if Pakistan would
provide access to A. Q. Khan or otherwise provide more information on the extent
of his network.  Iran’s current defiance of the IAEA and the UN Security Council
also underscores the limitations of multilateral approaches to countries with
sufficient financial and technological resources, and significant reverse leverage. 
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Expanding the cooperative threat reduction program to Pakistan could be
difficult for several reasons.  Significant barriers to assistance include U.S. domestic
and international legal and political restrictions on cooperation with states outside the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); the low level of transparency exhibited by
Pakistan; lack of incentives for Pakistan to pursue threat reduction measures; and
potentially competing objectives of threat reduction and nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis
India.122
Option 3 — Condition High Value Assistance on Access to 
A.Q. Khan
The United States might insist on the following actions by Pakistan as a price
for obtaining valued military equipment, especially weapons systems that are not
directly related to counterterrorism cooperation, such as F-16 aircraft, anti-tank
weapons, and other weapons systems that Pakistan is seeking to offset or exceed
Indian capabilities.  This option could require Pakistan’s agreement to:
! full cooperation on Khan’s network,
! absolute commitment on no future transfers of nuclear or missile
technology, and
! no new nuclear tests and restraint on nuclear and missile competition
with India
This option could also include longer-term waiver authority on U.S. nuclear and
missile proliferation sanctions beyond the current year-to-year extensions in
appropriations bills.  
A key rationale for this option is that providing Pakistan with such high value
weapons systems is only warranted if the benefits exceed the cost.  In this case, the
cost to the United States is not just the dollar value of the weapons systems but also
the inevitable complications for relations with India, a country with which the United
States also has developed a de facto strategic relationship.  The record of the past half
century shows that every increase in Pakistan’s military capability sooner or later will
be matched by India (or vice-versa).  Given the growing closeness of U.S.-India
relations in recent years, India is likely also to seek U.S. high technology weapons
systems.  One question that Congress may wish to consider is whether the United
States is paying too high a price, including a cost to its own foreign policy interest
in a stable and peaceful India-Pakistan relationship, for what it is getting from
Pakistan.
A potentially significant problem with this option is that so long as Musharraf
or a successor perceives that the Bush Administration needs him more than he needs
the United States, Pakistan is in a position to turn the tables on U.S. policymakers.
That is, instead of treating the F-16’s or other weapons systems as a  “carrot,” to be
earned by additional cooperation, Pakistan could reduce or limit its cooperation on
terrorism as a lever to get the United States to agree to allow the purchase of the
CRS-36 
123 “Bin Laden’s Trail Gone cold: Musharraf.”  Agence France Presse, Dec. 5, 2004; 17:04.
124 “As Nuclear Secrets Emerge, More Are Suspected.” New York Times, Dec. 26, 2004: 1,
12.
125 “U.S.-Pakistan Arms Deal Tests Good Will of Indians.”  Washington Times, Dec. 18,
2004: A8.
aircraft and other desired hardware.   In fact, some of President Musharraf’s remarks
at a press conference during a visit to Washington in early December 2004 could be
interpreted as effort to put counter-pressure on the United States to approve the sale
of the F-16’s.  Musharraf told reporters that he had discussed the F-16 issue with
President Bush and senior U.S. officials, but that the Administration had not yet
agreed to the requested purchase.  At the same time, Musharraf also implied
declining enthusiasm about using Pakistani forces to hunt for Al Qaeda in tribal zone
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, where many believe bin Laden and other senior
terrorist leaders may be hiding.  He reportedly criticized the U.S. invasion of Iraq and
said that the trail of Osama bin Laden had gone cold, “in large part” because of a
decline in operations by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and delays in the training of
Afghan forces123
As of early 2005, the Bush Administration has notified Congress of its intention
to go ahead with a number of major weapons sales to Pakistan, but not the F-16’s.
Whether the Administration’s failure to approve the request might be the result of a
strategy to gain more cooperation on  A. Q. Khan’s network and Al Qaeda, concern
about the reaction of India, or other reasons cannot be determined from open sources.
However, some press reports in late 2004 appear to indicate growing impatience in
the Administration with Pakistan’s unwillingness to shed much light on A. Q. Khan’s
past activities, and alarm about evidence that the network may be much more
extensive and dangerous than previously assumed.124  The Indian government,
meanwhile, strongly protested the sale of the F-l6’s and other major military
hardware during a visit to New Delhi by Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld in early
December 2004.125
Although trying to use the sale of F-16’s to Pakistan as leverage for more
cooperation regarding A. Q. Khan’s network might be risky, Musharraf’s domestic
political vulnerabilities noted above might give the United States the upper hand in
any test of wills.  In any event, withholding approval of the sale of the F-16’s until
Pakistan provides better cooperation on A. Q. Khan’s network may be the least risky
of various options to pressure Pakistan to be more responsive to U.S. nuclear
proliferation concerns.
Option 4 — Reimposition of Nuclear Nonproliferation
Sanctions
For reasons noted above, neither Congress or the Administration has shown
much enthusiasm for nuclear non-proliferation sanctions, apart from expanding the
scope of existing laws to include terrorist acts and threats of attacks with weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).  Sections 6801, 6802, and 6803 of P.L. 108-458 (S. 2845),
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004, amend provisions of
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the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and other laws to expand their scope to include
penalties for the  participation of individuals, either inside or outside the United
States, in “the development or production of any special nuclear material,” or
terrorist threats of the use of WMD.126
Either the President or Congress could reimpose sanctions on Pakistan.  In the
case of the President, he could decline to use his general authority under Section 614
of the Foreign Assistance Act, which gives the President broad powers to waive,
subject to consultation with Congress, nonproliferation sections of the Foreign
Assistance Act that would otherwise apply to Pakistan.  He could also decline to use
waiver authority provided annually in successive foreign operations appropriation
acts since 2001 to waive provisions of appropriations acts that forbid assistance to
countries in default of their debt repayments or whose democratic government has
been overthrown in a military coup.  Congress also has the power to block the
President’s use of waiver authority under Section 614 and other legislation.
Additionally, Congress could decline to renew the annual foreign operations
appropriations authority to waive the ban on aid to countries that are in default on
their debts or have governments that took power by military coups.  Congress could
also condition U.S. aid to Pakistan on specific requirements such as full cooperation
by the Musharraf government in efforts to learn the full extent of A. Q. Khan’s
network.  Under present circumstances the President could be expected to resist
strongly any effort to constrain his freedom of action regarding Pakistan, both on
policy grounds and the defense of executive branch authority.
